The place of conscientious objection in liberal democracy

Galeotti, Anna Elisabetta The place of conscientious objection in liberal democracy. [Articles (Articoli)]

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1. In this presentation I intend to raise two questions: first, is there any place left for conscientious objection in liberal democracy? Second, if there is any, which claims to conscientious objection (CO) can be accepted? The two questions, taken together, concerns the problem of the justification of CO. The answer to the first question will show that, despite contrary appearance, there is indeed some room, albeit interstitial, for CO to be raised. However, finding some room for CO within the framework of liberal democracy does not ipso facto provide a justification for it. Quite the opposite: the argument in fact shows that no proper justification can be put forward for CO in general. Yet, given its general commitment to religious liberty and freedom of conscience, liberal democracy is uneasy to reject CO altogether. But then further argument is needed to show which qualifications can make CO claims more or less acceptable. The answer to the second question is meant to single out qualifications which, while add normative strength to CO claims, also account for actual political decisions to grant or withhold them.

Item Type: Articles (Articoli)
Uncontrolled Keywords: conscientious objection, religious liberty, freedom, liberal democracy
Subjects: P Philosophy
Depositing User: Unnamed user with email
Date Deposited: 18 Dec 2008 10:31
Last Modified: 18 Dec 2008 10:31

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